The Story Of The Liberation Of Hyderabad

On this day in 1948, Hyderabad was liberated and integrated with the Indian Union. Here is a brief account of the liberation excerpted from ‘Twisting Facts To Suit Theories’ And Other Selections From Voxindica (2016. Authors Press. New Delhi), pp. 309–318    

The erstwhile Hyderabad state is in the heart of India bridging the north and the south. Surrounded as it was on all sides by Indian territory, it was a landlocked state with no access to the sea. What were then known as the Central Provinces lay to its north, Bombay to the west and the Madras Presidency to the south and east. It was predominantly a Hindu state with Hindus comprising 85% of the population. However, under the Nizam’s rule the bulk of civil service, police and armed forces were almost monopolized by Muslims. In the 132-member state legislative assembly constituted in 1946, the Muslims had ten more seats than the Hindus, to ensure the Muslims a majority and ipso facto a veto power over all matters.

Rejecting the June 1947 British partition plan, the Nizam demanded the status of an independent domain and membership of the British Commonwealth. He did not send any representatives to the Constituent Assembly. We are unable to ascertain whether the Nizam was able to gauze the mood of the people aright, with winds of independence and democracy sweeping across the landscape. But he was constrained by two factors. One was that the bulk of his administration (civil, military and police) were made up of Muslims who feared they might lose their elite position in a democratic set up. The second was Kasim Razvi’s Muslim communal organization, the Ittehadul-Muslimeen (MIM): 

“The Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen was a Muslim communal organization. Its leader was one Kasim Razvi who combined fanaticism with charlatanry. He had organized a shock brigade called the Razakars. The organization aimed at creating a theocratic and totalitarian State. Militarist demonstrations were part of their routine.”¹² 

The accession and integration of Hyderabad was complicated by another factor, which the Nizam and his advisers exploited to almost scuttle the process: 

“Sardar and V. P. Menon were dealing with the situation through me [K. M. Munshi, the Agent General of the Government of India in Hyderabad] to secure the accession of the State on the same terms as the accession of other States. Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General, carried on negotiations with the Nizam’s Prime Minister, Laik Ali, supported by Sir Walter Monckton, and was prepared to concede substantial autonomy to Hyderabad if the Nizam only signed a document to come into the Union. [...] Jawaharlal Nehru was averse to the line followed by Sardar.”¹³ 

The Nizam warned of communal trouble and even bloodshed in Hyderabad, in the event of his state’s accession to the Indian Union. As negotiations between a delegation sent by the Nizam¹⁴ and the Indian government were going on, the state was clandestinely preparing to take on the Union. It had placed an order for arms and ammunition worth three million pounds sterling with Czechoslovakia. It had also been in contact with Pakistan for a possible accession. 

Earlier, the Nizam’s British legal adviser Walter Monckton (a friend of Mountbatten, whose services he secured for the Nizam) was in touch with British Conservative party leaders like Samuel Hoare to negotiate separate Commonwealth membership for Hyderabad. This was even before the process of transfer of power by the British and the dissolution of Paramountcy began. Monckton was mediating with the Portuguese for the acquisition of port facilities in Goa and laying a railway line to the port. He advised the Nizam to have an association (which could be annulled at any time) and not accession (which was of a permanent nature) with India. This was probably the reason why the Nizam was willing to arrive at an agreement with the Indian government for his state’s association but would not sign the ‘Instrument of Accession’. He had sent his own draft of the agreement which the government of India was not willing to entertain. 

It was the avowed policy of the government of India that there would be no variation in the terms and conditions offered by it to the princely states. The rulers had to sign the ‘Standstill Agreement’¹⁵ and the ‘Instrument of Accession’¹⁶ without variation and at the same time. Despite this, as time was running out and to avoid a possible communal conflagration in the state, the Indian government agreed to sign an ‘Agreement’ (it was called ‘Heads of Agreement’) with Hyderabad that combines the gist of the ‘Standstill Agreement’, incorporating in it important matters like ‘defence’ and ‘external affairs’ (from the ‘Instrument of Accession’) along with a collateral letter from the Nizam. The drafts were passed back and forth between Delhi and Hyderabad amended each time to accord additional concessions demanded by the Nizam’s negotiating committee. The Nizam’s Executive Council deliberated on the last draft for three days and decided to accept it. But the Nizam postponed signing it again and again. In hindsight one might wonder whether the Nizam postponed it long enough for the MIM to mobilise enough crowds to blockade the members of the negotiating committee—which was to leave for Delhi to submit the ‘Agreement’ for countersigning and ratification. 

In the early hours of October 27 a mob consisting of twenty five to thirty thousand cadres of the MIM surrounded the residences of Nawab of Chhatari, President of the Executive Council, Nawab Ali Yawar Jung, Sir Walter Monckton, which were all in the same locality. Its objective was to prevent the negotiating committee members to leave for Delhi for concluding the agreement. The Nizam reconvened the Executive Council meeting. It was here his character appeared dubious. While on the one hand condemning MIM for threatening the negotiating committee members and physically blocking their departure to Delhi, he invited MIM leader Kasim Razvi to the meeting! Razvi wanted the Nizam to reject the negotiated agreement and insist on the Indian government signing the original draft provided by the Nizam. He was sure the Indian government would not resort to any precipitate action as its army was tied up in Kashmir. Indian troops were moved to Kashmir to repel the (Pakistani) tribal invasion that began on October 23. 

As negotiations with the Indian government meandered on, Kasim Razvi and his MIM were firming their grip on the Nizam. The Nawab of Chhatari resigned as the President of the Nizam’s Executive Council. At Razvi’s instance the Nizam appointed Mir Laik Ali a prominent businessman and a former representative of Pakistan in the UNO as its President. At the same time the negotiating committee too was reconstituted. While Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung and Pingle Venkatarama Reddy were retained, significantly Abdur Rahim a hard-core, fanatical member of the MIM was included as the third member. The reconstitution of the Executive Council and the negotiating committee with MIM fanatics brought about a dramatic change in the Nizam’s approach to whole issue. In a fresh letter sent to the government of India the Nizam threatened that if negations broke down this time, he would immediately conclude an agreement with Pakistan. The Nizam, it appeared, was all along planning his moves in consultation with Pakistan. 

The Nizam finally signed the two documents, the ‘Standstill Agreement’ (or the renamed ‘Heads of Agreement’) and the collateral letter on November 29, 1947. The ‘Standstill Agreement’ was valid for one year, as agreed upon earlier. Indian leaders in Delhi had divergent views on the agreement. Nehru thought that at last peace was bought in the south. Mountbatten thought that he bought time to soften the Nizam and would be able to persuade him to sign the ‘Instrument of Accession’ eventually. Sardar with his uncanny vision was doubtful. He was right. Declassified secret documents relating to the liberation of Hyderabad bear this out. The Nizam had said that the signing of the agreement was just to ‘mark time.’ He was prepared to have a European Prime Minister, if it would help him avoid accession to India and get him membership of the Commonwealth. Intelligence reports of the time confirm secret gun running between Pakistan and India with planes carrying illegal arms landing in Bidar and Warangal.¹⁷ 

The administration in Hyderabad was waiting for the Indian army to be withdrawn and recoup its strength. Almost immediately after signing the agreement, which it had no intention of honouring, it started needling the Indian government. It issued two ordinances, one for banning export of precious metals from Hyderabad to India and the other rendering Indian currency invalid in Hyderabad. It appointed a Public Relations Officer in Karachi and advanced a loan of ₹20 Crore to the government of Pakistan without consulting the Indian government. It did its best (or worst) to make the functioning of K. M. Munshi (Government of India’s Agent General in Hyderabad), very difficult. His movements were restricted, so much so, he became a virtual prisoner in his own residence in Hyderabad. 

While the government of India was lulled by a false sense of achievement, the MIM in Hyderabad was up to its treasonable activities. Razvi began inciting Muslims and abusing Hindus in his rabble rousing speeches. The objective of the Razakars was to terrorise the Hindu population. Munshi kept filing reports and the government of India was waiting and watching. Neighbouring states like Bombay and the Madras Presidency were complaining about the attacks on their borders by the Razakars. In one such incident, the Madras-Bombay mail was waylaid in the Gangapur railway station in the Hyderbad state. Hooligans armed with daggers, hockey-sticks and lathis attacked the train from both sides, while policemen on the platform looked on. While the mob attacked the train, armed Razakars stood by on the platform. In the incident two men travelling in the train were killed, eleven seriously injured and thirteen were reported missing. The law and order situation in many parts of the state deteriorated. In Jalna, Aurangabad, Parbhani and Nanded districts looting, arson, murders, rapes and molestation of women were reported, in which surprisingly, police personnel joined the Razakars. In despair, Hindus sought shelter outside the state. J. V. Joshi a member of the Nizam’s Executive Council felt compelled to resign his position. In his resignation, he detailed the deteriorating law and order situation: 

“A complete reign of terror prevails in Parbhani and Nanded districts. I have seen in Loha a scene of devastation which brought tears to my eyes—Brahmins were killed and their eyes were taken out. Women had been raped; houses had been burnt down in large numbers. The most disconcerting news which reached us was that the Razakars had allied themselves with the Communists. In 1943 the Nizam had banned the Communist Party throughout the State. This ban was now lifted. Moreover, we came to know that the Communists were being supplied with arms.”¹⁸ (Italics added.) 

So much for the nationalism, patriotism and law–abiding nature of the communists! As the Government in Hyderabad continued to violate the ‘Agreement’, Mountbatten and Nehru continued to hope things would sort themselves out on their own. They gave more time and more concessions to appease an administration, which was quite apparently controlled by the MIM. Mountbatten was to retire on June 21 and would leave India for ever. He wanted a prize trophy to take home. Nehru indulged him. Patel willy-nilly went along, probably marking time till his departure. Another—futile—‘Heads of Agreement’ (with obviously more concessions, beyond which, even the pliant Nehru could not stretch) was broached, discussed, debated, and tossed back and forth between Hyderabad and Delhi. 

The view in Hyderabad, no doubt formulated by the MIM, was that no matter what the provocation, the Indian government would not dare send its troops into Hyderabad as it would anger the entire Muslim community in the country. A section of the political establishment in the government in Delhi was apprehensive of possible repercussions and hence wanted to avoid decisive action. In the third week of August, Laik Ali complained to the government of India about ‘flagrant violations’ of the ‘Standstill Agreement’. Even before receiving a reply, the Nizam administration addressed a letter to the president of the UNO. 

In the meantime the law and order situation deteriorated further. After careful consideration of the pros and cons, much against the wishes of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Home Ministry decided to move Indian troops to Hyderabad. The operation to liberate Hyderabad was codenamed ‘Operation Polo’. It was led by Maj. Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri. On September 13, the army marched into Hyderabad along two axes: Sholapur–Hyderabad and Bezawada–Hyderabad. There was some resistance on the first two days but it petered out after that. The Hyderabad army surrendered on September 17. According to Menon, the casualties on the Indian side were few but on the other side: 

“[..] owing to scrappy operations and lack of discipline, the Irregulars and the Razakars suffered comparatively more casualties. The number of dead was a little over 800. It is unfortunate that so many should have died in this action, though the number is insignificant when weighed against the killings, rape and loot inflicted by the Razakars on the Hindus of the State.”¹⁹ (Italics added.) 

Menon, as befits a former bureaucrat, gave a staid, straight forward account of the happenings leading to partition and the integration of states, without frills and embellishments. As it was a personal narrative there was perhaps a slight accent on ‘I’ but he steered clear of either eulogizing or criticizing the principal players, including Mountbatten. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the casualty figures mentioned by him. Why bloated figures of huge numbers of casualties of the Razakars and the Muslims, propagated by Pakistani sources should be accepted in India as eternal truth and etched in popular perception is a mystery. 

Maj. Gen. Chaudhuri was appointed the Lt. Governor of Hyderabad on September 18. On September 23, the Nizam cabled the UNSC, withdrawing his earlier complaint. The integration of the state into the national mainstream took another three years. There is a footnote to the Hyderabad story told by K. M. Munshi: 

“If Jawaharlal had his way, Nizam’s Hyderabad would have remained unintegrated and would have become a second Pakistan in the ‘belly’ of India, an intensely hostile State separating the North and the South—although after the success of the police action Jawaharlal Nehru was the first to go to Hyderabad to receive an ovation as the liberator of Hyderabad. [...] As the Hyderabad situation was inexorably moving towards a climax, due to the intransigence of the Nizam and his advisers, Sardar considered it advisable to let the Nizam’s Government know clearly that the patience of the Government of India was fast getting exhausted. Accordingly a communication to that effect was sent from the States Ministry by V. P. Menon. [...] When Jawaharlal Nehru came to hear of this, he was extremely upset. A day before our army was scheduled to march into Hyderabad he called a special meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet [...] flew into a rage and upbraided Sardar [...] He concluded his outburst with the remark that in future he would himself attend to all matters relating to Hyderabad. [...] The meeting [however] dispersed without transacting any business.”²⁰ 

………………………………… 

N. B.: End note numbers are as in original. 

¹² Menon, V. P. (1955). “The Story Of The Integration Of The Indian States”. Longmans Green & Co. London. p. 221. 

¹³ Munshi, K. M. (1967). “Indian Constitutional Documents: Volume 1. Pilgrimage to Freedom” Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. p. 169. 

¹⁴ Nawab of Chhatari, President of the Executive Council, Nawab Ali Yawar Jung, Sir Walter Monckton, K.C., Abdur Rahim and Pingle Venkatarama Reddy. 

¹⁵ It is an agreement that assures continuance of any ‘existing agreements and administrative arrangements in the matters of common concern’ existing between the Indian state and the British government. It specifies eighteen administrative areas in the Schedule attached to the agreement. It also signifies the end of Paramountcy of the British government. 

¹⁶ It is an agreement signed by the ruler of the princely state and the dominion of India subjecting the princely state to the Government of India Act 1935. The Instrument of Accession binds the state to the jurisdiction of the Union government for making laws in the areas of Defence, External Affairs, Communications and some ancillary matters. 

¹⁷ Joseph, Josy. (2013). “Gandhi is an old fool and his character is doubtful, Nizam said”. The Times of India. August 1, 2013. See http://goo.gl/t22HZs 

¹⁸ Menon, 1955. Cited supra. p. 252-253. 

¹⁹ Menon, 1955. Cited supra. p. 256. 

²⁰ Munshi, 1967. Cited supra. p. 170

Undermining Democratic Institutions: Fact And Fiction

Ever since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014, the charge of “undermining institutions” has been a constant refrain in what is popularly but not factually known as the mainstream media. He has been accused of “undermining” every known institution from the Indian Council of Historical Research to the Reserve Bank of India. The raucous babble reached its crescendo after Urjit Patel (a Modi appointee) announced his resignation for personal reasons as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. The crescendo reached even a higher pitch after Shaktikanta Das a former IAS official was appointed as RBI Governor to replace Patel. Notwithstanding the fact that he served as the Revenue Secretary, the Economic Affairs Secretary and as a member of the Fifteenth Finance Commission, it was his educational qualifications that became the bone of contention.

It must be remembered that when Modi assumed charge as prime minister he left most of the ‘steel frame’ that he inherited in place except for a few minor changes. It is against this backdrop, it may be instructive to look back and review who “undermined institutions” the most. Jawaharlal Nehru ruled for nearly eighteen years since he became the interim prime minster in 1946 till his death in 1964. His daughter Indira ruled the nation for sixteen years, from 1966 to 1977 and from 1980 till her death in 1984. Her son Rajiv ruled the nation between 1984 and 1989. His wife Sonia ruled by proxy between 2004 and 2014. Political chicanery of that magnitude – which amounts to nothing less than undermining the highest political office in the land – would not have been possible in any other democracy in the world.

Deception, Disinformation and Psychological Operations have been originally employed by intelligence agencies but politicians caught on to them fast. The Congress party has for long invested in an ecosystem of academic institutions and the media. They come in handy to discredit and disarm political rivals by deception, disinformation and psychological operations. Coming back to the issue of “undermining institutions”, here is a non-exhaustive list of examples of how institutions were undermined or worse sabotaged to suit political whims and fancies under various Congress leaders.

Jawaharlal Nehru

Let us begin with the reign of Jawaharlal Nehru who has been hailed as an epitome of democratic values.

Curtailing freedom of expression India’s best and brightest minds toiled for about three years to craft the longest written Constitution of the world. It was adopted on January 26, 1950. Even before the ink on the original Constitution dried, Nehru proposed the first amendment. The Americans amended their Constitution about thirty times in two hundred and forty years while we enacted a hundred and one amendments in seventy years. Whereas the American first amendment strengthened freedom of expression, Nehru’s first amendment, enacted on June 18, 1951 curtailed freedom of expression.

Curtailing powers of the judiciary The Indian first amendment did more. It created the Ninth Schedule which barred judicial scrutiny of legislations included in it.

Downgrading the Finance Ministry Enamoured as he was of the Soviet system of governance, he created the Planning Commission an extra-Constitutional body, which in a way reduced the importance of the Finance Ministry.

Dismissing state governments When Nehru used the Art. 356 of the Indian Constitution to dismiss the Kerala state government in 1959, he set a dubious precedent.

Undermining the Cabinet and Parliament Nehru took many decisions which have had long-lasting adverse effects without consulting the parliament or his own cabinet, thus undermining the institutions. The decisions include

Calling a ceasefire in Jammu & Kashmir in October 1947 when the Indian army was winning the war. The effect of this ill-advised decision was to lose a third of the state and altering international borders with India’s neighbours. Had India retained PoK, we would have retained Gilgit-Baltistan too. We would have had a border with Afghanistan. His decision to refer the issue to the UNO was equally inexplicable.

Dilly-dallying on Junagadh and Hyderabad against the wishes of the Cabinet. But for Patel’s timely action, these states would now have been part of Pakistan.

Concealing intelligence reports about the construction of a mountain road network in Aksai Chin by the Chinese.

Withdrawing unilaterally the extra-territorial rights in Tibet which India inherited from the British.

Sacrificing Tibet by accepting the Chinese claim that Tibet was a part of it.

[The last two ill-advised decisions removed a buffer state between India and China.]

Refusing to accept United Nations Security Council seat when it was offered on a platter to India but instead demanding that it be granted to China.

Refusing accession of Kalat and Nepal At the time of partition, a few neighbouring States wished to accede to India. These include Nepal and the Kingdom of Kalat which forms a large part of modern Baluchistan. Nehru rejected them. Oman which owned the port of Gwadar on the southwest coast of Baluchistan offered to sell it to India. Again for reasons best known to him Nehru rejected the offer.

The worst undermining of all was refusing to look after the needs of the Indian armed forces in terms of manpower recruitment and training and equipment.

Inducting dynastic succession. Nehru made his sister Vijayalakshmi ambassador to the United Nations and the USSR. His daughter Indira was unofficially Nehru’s personal assistant through his years as the prime minister. This made her privy to government documents despite the Official Secrets Act. Later he made his daughter the president of AICC.

Awarding himself the Bharat Ratna The award is recommended by the prime minister. But Nehru was the first recipient of the award in the year of its institution. Nehru’s apologists argue that Rajendra Prasad did it off his own bat to signal truce between them but nothing prevented Nehru from refusing to accept it. 

Indira Gandhi

Revocation of Privy Purses to the former Maharajas. It was a sovereign guarantee given to them by the Constituent Assembly. Her action amounted to undermining the authority of the parliament.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s she had had several judicial reverses. They include the Bank Nationalization case, the Privy Purses case and the Fundamental Rights case. Unlike her father who simply amended the Constitution in response to adverse judicial verdicts, she went a step ahead and undermined the judiciary itself. Within hours after the verdict in the Fundamental Rights case was delivered in 1973, she superseded several judges and appointed a pliant judge as the CJI.

Refusing to heed the judicial verdict about her parliament seat.

Declaring the (internal) Emergency which undermined democracy itself. Technically the (external) Emergency declared in 1962 after the Chinese invasion was still in force. Neither her father nor she saw it necessary to repeal it! Fundamental rights including the right to life suspended.

Dismissing state governments and Governors at will.

Her refusal to accept a split in the Congress party and her lust for power led to the 1969 Gujarat riots which lasted – six months – and resulted in the death of about 5000 people. The 1983 Nellie massacre in which 3000 Muslims were killed occurred in Indira’s reign. By the by, more than 90% of communal riots in India occurred during the reigns of Jawaharlal, Indira and Rajiv.

Making her son Snjay a supra-Constitutional authority. Chief Ministers danced to his tunes.

Her propping up Bhindranwale to undermine the Akalis and her war on the Golden temple.

Awarding herself the Bharat Ratna This time the fig leaf of Rajendra Prasad was not there.

An action that has long-lasting adverse effects was handing over the universities and other intellectual institutions to the left-illiberal elite as a quid pro quo for political support.

Rajiv Gandhi

His reign began with the Sikh genocide, in which between 8000 and 10000 Sikhs were killed. The genocide was a blot on democracy, and the biggest undermining of the institution of democracy.

Sacking his Finance Minister to alter the import policy (for importing PTA and other chemicals used in the manufacture of polyester fibre). This was to favour Dhirubhai Ambani. The policy declaration was a replica (or was it a template) of the 2G spectrum auction.

His grandfather sought to control freedom of expression through his first amendment. His mother used carrots and sticks to reign in the media. He sought to control the media through an amendment to the Posts and Telegraphs Act, but had to drop it due to widespread criticism.

He sacked his Foreign Secretary, A. P. Venkateswaran in a press conference

Sonia Maino (the de facto PM)

Creation of the institution of ‘UPA Chairperson’. It was an extra-Constitutional authority.

Creation of the extra-Constitutional NAC which was a supra-Cabinet superintending the work of the prime minister’s Cabinet.

Commissioning social “activists” like Teesta Setalvad to draft legislation (the impugned Communal Violence Bill) and school text books.

Now let us see the other argument about an IAS officer being appointed as the Governor of RBI. The following RBI Governors were from the IAS: B. Rama Rau, K. G Ambegaonkar, H. V. R. Iyengar, L. K. Jha, S. Jagannathan, R. N. Malhotra, S. Venkateswaran and Y. V. Reddy.

Finally, let us look at the argument that only economists should head economic institutions. In the years between 1970–1973; 1976–1983; 1985–1987; 1990–1997; 2000–2013 and 2017–2018 Americans won the Nobel Prize for economics. India’s Amartya Sen won it in 1998 giving us bragging rights! While the Americans won the maximum number of economics Nobel prizes or shared them with others, the American economy has had its ups and downs. The American economy saw recession in the years 1969-70; 1973-75; 1980-82; the early 1990s; the early 2000s and the worst in 2007-8. The 2008 collapse wiped out life’s savings of many Americans including Indian expatriates, making millions paupers overnight. So much for economists!

Patel Reversed Junagadh’s Accession To Pakistan And Reintegrated In India

Did you know that Prabhas Patan, where the famous Somnath temple is located would have been in Pakistan had not Sardar Patel acted with dispatch and decisiveness in October-November 1947? Thanks to the history doctored by omission and commission by the left-illiberal historians few people in India today know the story of Junagadh. As everyone knows, the British gave 565 princely states the option to join India or Pakistan in August 1947. Of these two could not have joined India because of their geographical location.

A third, Kalat which constitutes a major part of Balochistan wanted to join India but Nehru’s political myopia prevented that. Jinnah moved swiftly to annex the mineral-rich State. Jammu and Kashmir was not the only state which Pakistan sought to occupy by force. Whereas Pakistan could only partially succeed in its designs on J & K, it fully occupied Kalat. Thus Pakistan which was founded based on religion had a violent streak in its national psyche since its inception although peace lowers on the Indian side delude themselves that the leopard would someday shed its spots.

Some would argue that agreeing to the accession of Kalat to India would have attenuated the arguments for the integration of Hyderabad in India. However, Pakistan advanced the same arguments to annex Junagadh as India could for the accession of Kalat but did not, and did for the accession of Jammu and Kashmir but still lost a third of its territory.     

Of the remaining princely states Sardar Patel seamlessly integrated 560 states into the Indian Union, including a recalcitrant Hyderabad. Nehru who handled Jammu and Kashmir made a dog’s breakfast of it. There was another state, Junagadh which while pretending to join India secretly planned and joined Pakistan on August 15, 1947. Read why its accession would have been disastrous for India and how Sardar Patel reversed its accession to Pakistan and brought it back into India’s fold.

The princely state of Junagadh is at the south-western corner of the Saurashtra peninsula of modern Gujarat. It was an important state of what was known as the Kathiawar group of states in pre-independence India. Junagadh was deep inside and surrounded on three sides by India and on the south and southwest by the Arabian Sea. It has no overland route to Pakistan. The distance between the nearest ports Veraval (Junagadh) and Karachi (Sind, Pakistan) is about 300 miles. Another complicating geographical factor about the state is that throughout its borders either its territories jutted into neighbouring states like fingers or their territories jutted into it. Spread over 3,337 square miles, it had a population of 6.71 lakh according to 1941 census of which 80% were Hindus. Its famous Jain and Hindu temples including the famous Somnath temple attracted pilgrims from all over India.

While giving the impression that the state would accede to India, Junagadh secretly negotiated and on August 15, 1947 declared its accession to Pakistan. This was not acceptable to India for strategic reasons and the possible cascading effect it would have on the delicate negotiations with Hyderabad that were under way. On Pakistan’s right to accept Junagadh’s accession to it, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan informed Nehru that ‘a ruler had the absolute right to accede without reference to the moral or ethnic aspects of accession’.

In a discussion with Jinnah, Mountbatten read out the full statement of the Pakistan Prime Minister as reported by the Statesman of September 21, 1947:

“The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the other or to enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and constitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right of the States. Muslim League leaders before 15 August and the official spokesman of the Pakistan Government thereafter have publicly declared their agreement with this view; and have since rigorously stood by it. No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any State acceding to the Dominion of India.” (Italics added.) [1]

This was exactly India’s case regarding Jammu and Kashmir then and all along. Jinnah agreed that it was the legal position. Thus there appears to be unanimity on the subject of accession of Princely States in both India and Pakistan. Despite this, Mountbatten suggested that the matter of Junagadh and later, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir should be referred to the United Nations Organisation. In the case of Junagadh, Sardar Patel vetoed the proposal saying that there was grave danger in being a plaintiff before the UNO. As we will see later, the decision was taken out of Patel’s hands in the case of Jammu and Kashmir with disastrous consequences.

After futile negotiations with the eccentric Nawab of Junagadh and Pakistan, the cabinet decided to move a brigade of the Indian army to the Kathiawar states surrounding Junagadh which have already acceded to India for their protection and to assist their forces. It was designated as the ‘Kathiawar Defence Force’ (KDF).

The landlocked Junagadh state was dependent on the surrounding Kathiawar states for its economy and food grains. But as Junagadh now joined enemy Pakistan, in view of the uncertain political conditions, traders in the adjoining states refused to do business with it, resulting in a virtual economic blockade. There was utter chaos and a hundred thousand Hindus fled from the state. Realising the situation was going out of control, the Nawab took flight to Pakistan taking with him the entire State treasury.

One of the factors that precipitated the crisis was the peculiar situation of two tiny states, the principality of Babariawad and the Sheikdom of Mangrol in relation to Junagadh. In the pre-independence period Junagadh had jurisdiction over Babariawad and a portion of Mangrol. The two tiny states declared independence as soon as the British Paramountcy ended and signed instruments of accession with India. An angered Junagadh sent its troops to occupy Babariawad and Mangrol. India considered this an act of aggression and was forced to move its forces to liberate Babariawad and Mangrol. Mountbatten was informed of the move only after the army was already on the march. It was a move that pre-empted him.

In the meantime, the Kathiawar Congress leaders formed a provisional government (Arzi Hukumat) with Samaldas Gandhi as its President and with its headquarters at Rajkot. After the Nawab’s flight, the forces of Arzi Hukumat began dispersing into various parts of Junagadh. Sir Shah Nawaz, the Dewan of Junagadh opened negotiations with Samaldas Gandhi requesting him to take over the administration and restore law and order in the state. Despite protestations from Pakistan, the state’s request to accede to India was accepted. When Sardar Patel visited Junagadh on November 13 he received a rousing reception. As per earlier promise India conducted a referendum in Junagadh on February 20, 1948. Of the 2,01,457 registered voters 1,90,870 exercised their franchise and all except 91 voted in favour of the state’s accession to India. In a similar referendum conducted in Mangrol and Manavadar, Babariawad, Bantwa and Sardargarh, of the 31, 439 votes cast, only 39 favoured Pakistan. A year later on February 20, 1949 all these states were finally and fully integrated with the Indian Union.

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[1] Krishna, Balraj. (2007). India’s Bismarck Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. India Source Books. New Delhi. p. 205.

Excerpted from ‘TWISTING FACTS TO SUIT THEORIES’ AND OTHER SELECTIONS FROM VOXINDICA pp. 306-309

Abolition Of Privy Purses Betrayal Of Constitution?

Admirers of Indira Gandhi have often described the abolition of ‘Privy Purses’ as one of her principal achievements, along with the nationalisation of banks and the victory in the 1971 war. The first two were populist measures intended to derive electoral advantage in an era in which socialism was seen as a panacea for all social and economic ills. The third, viz. the Bangladesh war was in a way thrust upon India. To give Indira Gandhi her due she had the political will to stand up to Pakistan overtly supported by the USA. While China offered covert support to Pakistan there was the lurking fear that she might open up a second front in the war.

Privy Purses

The rulers of the erstwhile princely States which were amalgamated in the ‘Union of States’ as the Constitution described the newly emergent nation were to sign two documents known as the ‘Instrument of Accession’(IoA)[1] and the ‘Standstill Agreement’ (SA)[2]. Under the IoA the princes were to surrender only Communications, Defence, External Affairs and some ancillary matters to the Indian Union.

As late as February 1947, Nehru had assured the Negotiating Committee of the Chamber of Princes that neither the monarchical form of government, nor the integrity of the States, would be touched. […] The grant of Privy Purses to the rulers was a sort of quid pro quo for the surrender by them of all their ruling powers and for the dissolution of their States.[3]

The privy purses were thus an important component of Sardar Patel’s negotiated settlement with the 562 princely States which were amalgamated in the Indian union. The settlement was incorporated in the Indian Constitution under Articles 291 and 362.

When they agreed to amalgamate their States in the Indian union, the rulers of the princely States had surrendered the towns and villages that comprised the States, thousands of acres of jagir land, palaces and other buildings, museums with their invaluable treasures, armouries and aircraft (which the larger states had) and other properties. The cash balances and investments of the States which were taken over alone amounted to ₹77 crore. This figure however excludes the cash balances of two large states, Hyderabad and Mysore as they were continuing States at the time. The interest accruals on these amounts alone would more than cover the payment of Privy Purses. In addition to all these assets, the rulers also surrendered a railway system of roughly 12,000 miles (which, to put in perspective was about one sixth of the length of the present track network) and rolling stock, without receiving any compensation.

The Indian government agreed to compensate rulers at a rate of not more than 8.5% of their annual revenues with a ceiling of ₹10 lakh. In subsequent negotiations the ceiling was waived off in eleven cases. Of the 562 princely States 398 were eligible to receive less than ₹50,000 per annum. The largest State, Hyderabad received ₹43 lakh (which in 1947-48 was just 2% of the State’s revenues), whereas the smallest State, Katodia received just ₹192 per year. The objective of the Privy Purses was to

enable the rulers and their successors to adjust themselves to the new order of things and to fit themselves into the modern social and economic pattern (Ibid.)

The Privy Purses were in effect a kind of pension that the Constitution of a sovereign nation guaranteed to pay to the erstwhile rulers, and as Menon put it

The Privy Purse is intended to cover all the expenses of the ruler and his family, including the expenses on account of his personal staff, his palaces and the marriages and other ceremonies in his household. (Ibid.)

The Privy Purses were to be gradually reduced. At the time of independence, the annual outlay for the purses was ₹6 crore. By the time they were abolished by Indira Gandhi in 1971, the figure came down to ₹4 crore. To put this figure in perspective, it amounted to 0.1% of the estimated annual revenue receipts (₹3867 crore) for the year 1970-71.[4]

The Privy Purses were to be paid by the Indian Union into which the princely Sates were absorbed. The rulers were initially apprehensive that they would be at the mercy of the whims and fancies of the popular ministries of the states into which their States were absorbed. The apprehension turned out to be not entirely groundless as in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, as soon as the State acceded to the Indian Union, Sheik Abdullah expelled its ruler from the state. He refused to honour the agreement to pay the negotiated Privy Purse to the Maharajah. The Government of India was forced to pay the Privy Purse and continued to do so till its abrogation by Indira Gandhi.

Political Vendetta?

As in all other matters, the Indian left-illiberal have one take on Jammu and Kashmir and quite a different one for the rest of India. The Privy Purses have been the subject of intense debate for long. For instance they argued for the perpetuation of the purely temporary Article 370; while on the other hand they contended that the Privy Purses were not compatible with an ‘egalitarian social order’.

What could have cooked their goose, perhaps, was that some rulers joined C. Rajagopalachari’s Swatantra Party and in the 1967 general elections defeated many Congress candidates. Indira Gandhi was incensed by this and wanted to teach them a lesson by abolishing the Privy Purses. In 1969 her government introduced the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Bill. It was passed by the Lok Sabha with a majority of 332:154 votes but was defeated in the Rajya Sabha by 149:75 votes. Not one to bow to silly inconveniences like parliamentary procedures, she had a pliable President, V. V. Giri issue an order derecognizing the rulers. The September 6, 1970 order was challenged in the Supreme Court by N. A. Palkhivala (and others) in the famous Privy Purses Case and was struck down by the Supreme Court on December 15, 1970.[5]

After Indira Gandhi returned to power with a landslide majority in 1971, her government passed the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Bill to abolish the Privy Purses.

Here was what Sardar Patel said commending the adoption of Article 291 in the Constituent Assembly

The Privy Purse settlements are therefore in the nature of consideration for the surrender by the rulers of all their ruling powers and also for the dissolution of the States as separate units. We would do well to remember that the British Government spent enormous amounts in respect of the Mahratta settlements alone. We are ourselves honouring the commitments of the British Government in respect of the pensions of those rulers who helped them to consolidate their empire. Need we cavil then at the small — I purposely use the word small — price we have paid for the bloodless revolution which has affected the destinies of millions of our people?

The capacity for mischief and trouble on the part of the rulers if the settlement with them would not have been reached on a negotiated basis was far greater than could be imagined at this stage.

Let us do justice to them; let us place ourselves in their position and then assess the value of their sacrifice. The rulers have now discharged their part of the obligations by transferring all ruling powers and by agreeing to the integration of their States. The main part of our obligation under these agreements is to ensure that the guarantees given by us in respect of Privy Purses are fully implemented. Our failure to do so would be a breach of faith and seriously prejudice the stabilization of the new order.[6]

In the light of what Patel said, the abolition of the Privy Purses can only be seen as one of the most shameful episodes in the history of our nation because it was betrayal of a solemn Constitutional guarantee.

It may be appropriate to quote here what Arvind P. Datar had to say of the betrayal of the Congress party:

Sardar Patel persuaded the Constituent Assembly to guarantee payment of Privy Purses and preserve the rights of the erstwhile rulers. But the Congress betrayed him 20 years later by abolishing the Privy Purses.[7]

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[1] It is an agreement signed by the ruler of the princely State and the dominion of India subjecting the princely State to the Government of India Act 1935. The Instrument of Accession binds the State to the jurisdiction of the Union government for making laws in the areas of Defence, External Affairs, Communications and some ancillary matters.

[2] It is an agreement that assures continuance of any ‘existing agreements and administrative arrangements in the matters of common concern’ existing between the Indian State and the British government. It specifies eighteen administrative areas in the Schedule attached to the agreement. It also signifies the end of Paramountcy of the British government. 

[3] Menon, V.P. (1955). Chapter XXV, “The Cost of Integration”: The Story Of The Integration Of The Indian States. Longmans Green & Co. London. pp. 324-328.

[4] Annual budget speech for 1970-71 delivered by Indira Gandhi in the Lok Sabha on February 28, 1970. Accessible from http://indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs197071.pdf

[5] H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao ... vs Union Of India on 15 December, 1970. Accessible from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/660275/

[6] Menon, V.P. (1955). Chapter XXVI, “Retrospect and Prospect”: The Story Of The Integration Of The Indian States. Longmans Green & Co. London. pp. 329-335.

[7] “Who Betrayed Sardar Patel” The Hindu. November, 19, 2013. Accessible from http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/who-betrayed-sardar-patel/article5366083.ece